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Abstract:  Financial, managerial, and medical decisions often involve alternatives whose possible 
outcomes have uncertain probabilities.  In contrast to alternatives whose probabilities are known, 
these  uncertain  alternatives offer the benefits of learning. In repeat-choice situations, such 
learning brings value.  If probabilities appear favorable (unfavorable), a choice can be repeated 
(avoided). In a series of experiments involving bets on the colors of poker chips drawn from 
bags, decision makers often prove to be blind to the learning opportunities offered by uncertain 
probabilities. Such decision makers violate rational decision making and forgo significant 
expected payoffs when they shun uncertain alternatives in favor of risky ones.  Worse, when 
information is revealed, many make choices contrary to learning.  A range of factors explain 
these  violations. The results indicate  that  priming with  optimal strategies offers little 
improvement.  
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Financial, managerial, and medical decisions often involve choice alternatives whose outcomes 
have uncertain probabilities. In contrast to alternatives with known probabilities, these uncertain 
alternatives offer the opportunity for learning in repeat choices. If the probability of a desirable 
outcome turns out low, the alternative can be avoided in future choices; if the probability turns 
out high, the alternative can be chosen again on future occasions. Thus if repetition is possible, 
the opportunity for learning brings value, making uncertain alternatives more valuable than 
known-risk alternatives of identical expected value on a single trial.  To gather information 
regarding uncertain probabilities, people typically need to actively engage uncertain alternatives, 
something they are reluctant to do.   
  A range of theoretical analyses is based on the intuition of learning opportunities offered 
by uncertain alternatives. For instance, Grossman et al. (1977) show that, if learning is possible, 
consumers may buy a drug of unknown  reliability, to gain information about its potentially 
beneficial effects. Mirman et al. (1993) find that a monopolist may set prices that deviate from 
the short term myopic optimal level, to collect information about the demand  curve  for its 
product. Rasmusen (2010) studies employee behavior if some tasks reveal their uncertain skills 
and other tasks do not. And Mueller and Scarsini (2002) show why risk averters should prefer 
uncertain over safe lotteries if learning is possible.   
These studies clarify the benefits of uncertain alternatives in a range of applications. 
However, they do not speak to the question whether decision makers in the real world appreciate 
the benefits of learning opportunities offered by alternatives with uncertain probabilities, and 
therefore  choose these alternatives to collect valuable information. Indeed,  the empirical 
literature suggests that people often shun uncertain alternatives, forgoing significant benefits. 
Muthukrishnan et al. (2009) show that consumers prefer products from well established brands 
over cheaper products from less well-known brands, even when they consider them equally good 
in terms of quality. They find this effect for a large set of products, and find it most pronounced 
for people who avoid uncertain alternatives in a simple urn choice task. In a study of patients 
with chronic conditions, Frank and Zeckhauser (2007) find that primary care doctors treating 
depression tend  not  to  respond to changes in patients symptoms when deciding whether to 
change medicines or dosages. Teodurescu and Erev (2011) discuss a wide range of situations – 
e.g.,  negotiations with uncertain mutual benefits, and the  treatment of chronic depression  – 
where people forgo the beneficial exploration of uncertain alternatives.  3 
 
We  hypothesize that the neglect of learning opportunities offered by uncertain 
probabilities applies broadly, and that it will by strongly manifest in  choices made under 
laboratory conditions. Because  the above empirical observations  can be driven by  factors 
unrelated to the neglect of learning benefits, we conducted a set of controlled experiments that 
aimed to eliminate influences such as trust, accountability and liability, which often intrude on 
decisions outside the lab. The previous literature studying decisions with uncertain probabilities 
mainly focuses  on violations of expected utility (Savage  1954)  caused by the  aversion to 
ambiguous and compound lotteries in one-shot situations (Ellsberg 1961; Halevy 2007; Kaivanto 
and Kroll 2011, Spears 2009). Learning benefits are not relevant to such choices.  
Our analysis specifically allows for repeat choices and, therefore, for the opportunity for 
beneficial learning about uncertain alternatives. We find that blindness to learning opportunities 
under  uncertainty is deeply rooted.  Alternatives with uncertain probabilities are typically 
shunned in favor of options whose probabilities are known. . Our results suggest a range of 
explanations for  subjects’  violations  of rational learning. We identify  four categories  of 
individuals who violate optimal learning: underestimators, minimum learners, insensitive 
stickers, and fallacious switchers. Those in the first two groups underestimate learning 
opportunities although they get the direction of inference correct.  Insensitive stickers and 
fallacious switchers do worse when they make a second type of mistake: They make choices that 
are counter to what they have learned.   
Several papers provide surprising results showing insufficient appreciation of learning 
and counterintuitive results regarding the processing of feedback for equilibrium play in simple 
games (Merlo and Schotter 1999; Rick and Weber 2010). The current paper has a different focus 
than these studies; it makes anticipation of learning an inherent part of the decision problem. 
Consistent with the previous literature, however, we also find that there is little transferability 
across tasks. For example, forcing subjects to learn in one context does not lead them to choose 
learning in another. Our paper is closest in spirit to those of Charness and Levin (2005) and 
Charness, Karni, and Levin (2007), who show that violations of Bayesian learning are most 
common where the simple behavioral rule of reinforcement learning gives different predictions 
than Bayes’ rule. Those papers consider decision problems where all probabilities are known 
with certainty.  We address the basic learning paradigm when some probabilities are uncertain.  
We observe that people’s lack of a clear understanding of learning under uncertainty leads them 4 
 
to behave in a non-Bayesian manner.  In this sense our paper shows that the violations identified 
for known risks apply more broadly under uncertainty, and often prevent people from choosing a 
position that would provide them with beneficial learning opportunities.   
This paper reports on a series of experiments designed to test if subjects anticipate and 
properly appreciate the learning opportunities offered by uncertainty, and to tease out the various 
types of violations of rational learning behavior.  Each experiment offers an uncertain option that 
provides for formal learning in a laboratory decision task.  Moreover, the benefits of such 
learning are subject to mathematical calculation.  We did not expect any such calculations by our 
subjects, but they do permit calculations of expected value, and the loss of such value if the 
learning option is not chosen.  In Sections 1,  2,  and  3,  we  present three incentivized lab 
experiments  conducted with undergraduates at  Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The 
experiments  reveal  both  widespread  shunning  of options that provide learning benefits, and 
failures to learn in a rational fashion. We identify the four groups of violating subjects discussed 
above. Section 4 studies the limits of the learning violations and the transfer (or lack of transfer) 
of effective strategies across tasks.  Section  5  discusses  the implications of the results,  and 
presents an extension of the current paradigm. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
1. Experiment 1: Repeated Urn Choices  
 
1.1  Design 
Ninety-nine undergraduate students participated in a laboratory experiment with real monetary 
incentives. To model a learning opportunity under uncertainty, we conducted a set of choice 
experiments utilizing two bags
1
                                                 
1 In the experiments we used bags instead of urns. We will use the terms bag and urn interchangeably in the general 
description of choice situations.  In some experiments, marbles were used instead of poker chips.  
, each with two colors of poker chips.  In the baseline condition 
(BASE), we offered subjects a simple choice between a bet with known probabilities and an 
uncertain bet.   Below, we often follow the terminology developed by Frank Knight (1921), 
where  risky  refers  to bets with  known probabilities,  and uncertainty refers to bets whose 
probabilities are not known.  The risky choice was to bet on the color of a chip drawn from a bag 
known to contain 5 red and 5 black chips.  If the subject guessed the color correctly, she won 5 
 
€10; otherwise she won nothing.  The uncertain choice was to bet on the color of a chip drawn 
from a bag with 10 chips, either red or black, with the numbers of each color unknown.  Again, a 
correct guess won the subject €10, otherwise she won nothing.  
Both bags were assembled by the subjects themselves, who filled the bags with chips 
from a box with 50 red and 50 black chips.  Each subject first filled the known bag, and then, 
wearing a blindfold, put 10 chips into the uncertain bag.  If not stated otherwise, this procedure 
was  followed  in all urn-choice tasks in this  paper.  This  transparent  two-stage compound 
procedure was chosen to minimize any suspicion, and to emphasize the expected symmetry of 
colors in the uncertain option.  It follows from the design that, in this baseline one-shot decision, 
the expected winning probability equaled 50% for both the risky and the uncertain options, and 
the expected payoff from either option was thus €5.  Note that given the equal numbers  of the 
two colors in the box from which the uncertain bag was filled, and that draws were made without 
replacement, highly unbalanced distributions were quite unlikely.  
  To introduce the potential for learning in this setting, we included the following repeated 
urn-choice task (REPEAT), in which the subjects chose between betting twice on the color of a 
chip drawn from the bag with known composition or making the same bets with the uncertain 
bag.  The task had two components, A and B.  For A, the subject picked either the known or the 
unknown bag.  She would have to stick with this bag for the rest of the experiment.  For B, she 
had to bet on two successive trials on the color of a chip drawn at random from her chosen bag.  
On each trial, she was paid according to her prediction, as described above.
  After the first trial 
and before making her prediction for the second trial, the chip was replaced in the bag.   In the 
play on the first trial, she automatically observed the color of a chip drawn from her chosen bag.  
The subject then played the second trial, making a new prediction.  She could stick with her 
original color or switch to the other color, for another €10 prize. Thus, she could potentially 
adjust her bet according to the information gained from the first draw. The repeated, two-trial  
structure of component B was explained to the subjects and illustrated schematically by a time 
line before component A of the game was decided, that is before they had to choose between the 
known composition (risky) and unknown composition (uncertain) bags.      
  In the repeated game, for the risky bag the probability of winning is 50% for each draw. 
This is also true for the first draw from the uncertain bag. For the second draw from the uncertain 
bag, however, a subject can increase her chances of winning because she learned something from 
the first draw.  For instance, the drawing of a red chip on the first trial would be recognized by a 6 
 
rational subject as indicating that red is now more likely. Specifically, by predicting the color 
drawn from the uncertain bag the first time as her second prediction, the subject will win 54.5% 
on the second draw.  
  While in the  BASE  experiment both options are equally good from a Bayesian 
perspective, in the REPEAT game the expected value of the uncertain option is €10.45 versus 
€10 for the known option. A rational person might still pick the known option.  She might make 
a trade-off between learning benefits offered by the uncertain bag, and other motives that led her 
to shy away from uncertainty (Ellsberg 1961; Halevy 2007; Kaivanto and Kroll 2011, Spears 
2009). Thus, she may not choose the uncertain alternative even if she correctly understands 
learning. But if this is the case, increasing the relative benefit of the learning opportunity would 
make it more likely that the uncertain bag would be chosen.  
In contrast, if a  subject does  not  recognize  the benefits of learning under uncertainty, 
increasing the relative benefit of learning opportunities would not affect her choice between the 
known and unknown bag.  To discriminate between these two explanations, we employed  a 
second  two-trial treatment  to  see whether increased  learning benefits  made a difference. In 
treatment REPEAT4, the known bag contained exactly two red and two black chips, while the 
uncertain bag contained four chips, either red or black but in an unknown proportion. Otherwise 
the choice task was identical to the 10-chip, repeated, urn-choice task described above. Urns with 
fewer chips provide more significant learning, as going to the extreme case of a 1-chip urn 
makes clear. For the 4-chip case, the expected payoff from the known option is again €10, while 
for the uncertain option the expected payoff now equals €11.20, a 12% increase in expected 
payoff from correctly choosing on the second trial.
2
 
 
1.2 Results 
Table 1 shows the results.  In the baseline one-shot treatment, we replicated the pattern found in 
previous studies where options with known probabilities are preferred to options with uncertain 
probabilities that offer the same expected value. Only 23% of the subjects chose the uncertain 
option.  No preference for the (strictly better) uncertain option was observed in the two-trial 
treatments offering learning. The uncertain option received less than 50% of the play in both the 
                                                 
2 For the simple baseline game with no learning opportunities, it has been shown that the size of the urn (that is, the 
number of chips) does not affect behavior in one-shot choices between known and uncertain options (Pulford & 
Colman 2008). 7 
 
REPEAT10  and  REPEAT4  treatments.    No difference between treatments was statistically 
significant (χ
2 tests, all p>0.10).  However, the uncertain bag was selected somewhat less often 
in the REPEAT4 than the REPEAT 10 treatment (29% versus 39%), although the learning value 
was 2 2/3 times greater (1.20 versus 0.45) in REPEAT4. This provides strong evidence that 
subjects do not properly recognize learning opportunities. One possible explanation is that it may 
be hard to recognize that the 4-chip situation offers more learning than the 10-chip situation.   
 
Table 1. Choice of Uncertain Bet 
  BASE  REPEAT10  REPEAT4 
N  31  33  35 
Uncertain option chosen      7 (23%)  13 (39%)  10 (29%) 
binomial test, two-sided  p=0.003  p=0.296  p=0.017 
 
  Table  2  provides  strong additional  evidence  regarding the neglect of the potential 
learning benefits from uncertainty.  In this table, we show for the repeated-trial treatments the 
number of subjects who stayed with their first-trial prediction after either a successful or an 
unsuccessful prediction.  Of the subjects who chose uncertainty, almost 40% behaved directly 
contrary to learning. To illustrate, many subjects (50% for REPEAT10 and 40% for REPEAT4)  
stuck with their initial prediction, despite choosing the color that did not get drawn on the first 
trial, which indicated that the other color was more likely to be drawn on the second trial. The 
behavior may either derive from a strong gambler’s fallacy belief (“now red is due”), or may be 
caused by an insensitivity to learning, and by a decision to persist with a preferred color.  We call 
these people insensitive stickers.   
We also  observed  that  many  subjects  (29% in REPEAT10 and 40% in REPEAT4) 
switched after an initial success, although such a success indicated their initial color was more 
likely on the second trial. We label these individuals fallacious switchers. They behave in accord 
with the gambler’s fallacy. These two groups, the insensitive stickers and fallacious switchers, 
failed to capitalize on learning opportunities, indeed behaved directly contrary to them. They 
either drew wrong inferences, or drew no inferences from new information.   
Table 2 also shows that subjects who chose the known option sometimes switched after 
an initial success, but almost never switched after an initial failure.  That is, they deviated from 8 
 
purely random choice following some strategy.  It seems that such proclivities played a role as 
well for subjects choosing the uncertain urn, despite violating optimal learning behavior.  This 
can also be seen from the comparison of learning-compatible choices under uncertainty with “as-
if” learning-compatible choices with known risk.  “As-if learning” (AIL) indicates a choice that 
would have been compatible with learning had the subject been playing the uncertain option.  
While there is no learning involved when the known option was chosen, its results allow us to 
identify choice patterns to compare  with  behavior  when the uncertainty  bag was selected. 
Pooling data from the 4-chip and the 10-chip games, we find no clear support of the hypothesis 
that uncertainty choosers make more learning-compatible choices than the known-risk choosers 
(χ
2 test, p=0.145).   
Table 2.  Learning Behavior in Repeated-Bet Game 
 
Option chosen 
Stayed with color predicted in stage 1  Compatible 
with learning    First color right  First color wrong 
10-chip 
repeated 
Uncertain  5/7 (71%)  3/6 (50%)  8/13 (61%) 
Known  8/11 (73%)  9/9 (100%)  8/20 (40%)
AIL 
4-chip 
repeated 
Uncertain  3/5 (60%)  2/5 (40%)  6/10 (60%) 
Known  10/14 (71%)  10/11 (90%)  11/25 (44%)
AIL 
Note: AIL superscript indicates ”as-if learning” for known-risk option indicates a choice that 
would have been compatible with learning had the subject played the uncertain option.   
 
 
To our knowledge, there is no experimental evidence on repeated choices using a chance 
device between known risks and uncertain risks that offer learning opportunities. Yet, we believe 
that the potential to learn from uncertain situations is the norm in the world, albeit not with such 
artificial situations as drawing a ball from an urn.  One frequently has a repeat choice of dry 
cleaners, driving routes, or restaurants, or strategies to employ when dealing with employees or 
friends.  In each case, there will be available options where you are highly uncertain about 
outcomes, but it is logical to believe that what happens on first trial will correlate positively with 
the outcome on a second trial, implying the opportunity for learning.  The driving route question 
is as follows:  “You commute to work every day.  There are two possible routes.  Route A, your 
usual route, takes 30 minutes on average with a standard deviation of 3 minutes.  You have only 
tried Route B three times.  It has taken 28, 31, and 34 minutes.  You expect to be commuting for 9 
 
many years.  Should you stick with Route A, or try Route B a few more times?  We have asked 
this question in many venues.  Few individuals recognize the two-armed bandit feature of the 
problem, and the advantage of gathering information on Route B.
3
We should note that some past experiments involving no learning possibility have shown 
a tilt toward uncertainty in repeated settings.  Liu and Colman (2009) conducted experiments 
with repeated bets, each time with a newly assembled urn (hence no learning), and no switching 
opportunities.   If the uncertain urn offers a larger prize and 100 repetitions are made, subjects 
prefer the uncertain urn, though they preferred the known urn on one trial. These authors argue 
that, through repetition, the uncertainty about the probabilities is reduced to a 50% chance as in 
the known-risk lottery, but with a higher prize.  
 
Rode et al. (1999) studied the case in which at least x red balls have to be drawn in n 
trials.  Indeed, they found that people correctly  prefer  uncertainty  if x is large  relative to 
expectation, implying that the known urn would give a low chance of achieving x successes, so 
that the uncertain urn would offer a higher expected payoff.  We will present some data on this 
paradigm in section 5.  
Our results on switching strategies replicate basic patterns observed by Charness and 
Levin (2005) in decisions that involve only known probabilities. Many subjects violate optimal 
switching strategies, and these violations do not diminish with the stronger learning potential in 
the 4-chip case (see their result 3, p.1305). In our setting, such learning violations indicate a 
much stronger bias against the favorable urn. 60 to 70 percent of our subjects chose the less 
favorable urn. In their study, a pure known-risk setting, only 20 to 30 percent of the subjects 
chose the less favorable urn.    
 
 
2. Experiment 2: Making Learning Opportunities Salient  
 
In Experiment 1, we identified an insensitivity to learning, reinforced by  a  strong  type of 
gambler’s fallacy.  (Subjects choosing the known-risk option had no opportunity of falling into 
such error, since they learned nothing.)  Furthermore, the learning behavior emerged 
                                                 
3 Indeed, this advantage would persist even if Route B’s average time to date were slightly greater. 10 
 
endogenously from observations of outcomes in the uncertain  option, similar to the ways 
learning under uncertainty emerges in real world decisions.  Possibly the participants merely 
overlooked the learning opportunity. While such obliviousness might apply in many real-world 
problems, we predicted that if the possibility for learning were made more salient, people might 
correctly perceive strong benefits from pursuing it.  They would therefore predominantly choose 
the alternative with uncertain probabilities. To test this, we conducted an experiment in which 
people were forced to observe a sample before making their choices between known  and 
uncertain options, and where we could identify learning also for those who chose the risky 
option.   
 
 
2.1  Design 
Forty-seven undergraduate students participated in an experiment that built on the BASE 
condition described in the previous section.  The experiment consisted of two parts.  Part II was 
identical to the 10-chip bag one-shot two-color bet for a prize of €10 in BASE: choose between 
the known and the unknown bag, and bet on the color of a chip once.  In Part I, subjects had to 
draw one chip from the known  bag and one chip from the uncertain  bag, always with 
replacement.  They noted the colors sampled, and then had to predict the contents of the two 
bags, that is, whether they expected more red or more black chips, or an equal number of red and 
black chips in each one.  If the predicted compositions of both bags were correct, they would win 
€10.  It was made clear to the subjects that exactly the same bags with the same contents that 
they had sampled in Part I would also be used in the BASE task in Part II where they had to 
choose one bag and bet on a color. At the end of the experiment, one of the two parts would be 
chosen by coin toss for real payment.  
For the uncertain  bag, sampling a red chip implied that the bag  was more likely 
predominantly red than either predominantly black or equally distributed. For the known bag, the 
question was trivial because subjects knew that it contained equal numbers of red and black 
chips.  The question was included for reasons of symmetry and to check basic understanding of 
the procedure.  Indeed, all subjects correctly indicated the equal distribution in the known bag.  
Sampling from the uncertain  bag in Part I of the experiment forced the subjects to 
observe information about the distribution of colors, and allowed them to upgrade their expected 11 
 
likelihood of winning the prize for the Part II  urn  choice  task.  After sampling red, the 
probability of winning a bet on red increased to 54.5%.  The expected value of the ambiguous 
option was €5.45 versus €5.00 for the risky option, an increase of 9%.  Note that the benefit from 
learning was larger in this experiment than in the REPEAT task in experiment 1. In the repeated 
game, the subjects would still have to make the first bet without any information; hence, the 
proportional effect on total expected earnings would be smaller. Because all the subjects had to 
sample the uncertain bag and make a prediction regarding its contents, we could also observe 
learning errors for those choosing the known option.    
 
2.2 Results 
Table 3 shows the results. We found a similar level of uncertain urn choices as in the previous 
experiments, with 36% choosing uncertain (p=0.079, binomial test, two-sided). Overall, in the 
prediction of the contents of the uncertain urn, 26% violated learning and did not predict a 
majority of the color they drew. The incidence of this violation was similar among known-risk 
and uncertain-risk choosers.  For uncertain urn choosers, we also observed whether they violated 
learning by betting adversely on the color not drawn in the sampling draw. We found that 24% 
committed such errors and that this group did not completely overlap with the group of people 
who failed the predominant color prediction in Part I of this experiment.  
 
Table 3.  Predicted Composition and Urn Choices after Forced Sample  
                         Part II  Urn  Choice 
  Known   Uncertain  All 
Urn Choice  30 (64%)  17 (36%)  47 
Part I: violate learning in 
prediction of bag composition  7 (23%)  5 (29%)
*  12 (26%) 
Part II: violate learning in color 
prediction  –  4 (24%)
*   
Total incidence of learning 
mistakes  7 (23%)  7 (41%)  14 (30%) 
Note: * These two groups had two members in common. 
 
Among the 35 subjects who stated that they believed that the color they picked in Part I in the 
bag with uncertain composition was in the majority, 23 (roughly two thirds) then chose the risky 12 
 
bag in Part II.  We asked these subjects why they had not chosen the uncertain option, and then 
bet on the color they believed predominated in the bag.  Many argued that they had not perceived 
the sample as strong evidence for the color drawn and that they had predicted the majority 
composition more or less randomly.  Since they had seen no clear evidence for either color, they 
had preferred the known option in the Part II bet.  However, as the data show, it was still 
common for the subjects to predict the contents according to their samples.  While those who 
correctly predicted the composition but then shunned the uncertain option might basically have 
had the right intuition, they underestimated the value of the sample.   
Another group of subjects  fall into the  class  we call minimum learners.  They  also 
announced the learning-compatible contents but then chose the known option. When asked about 
their decision, these subjects suggested a maximin way of thinking about probabilities: drawing a 
sample of a red chip was counted as evidence of one red chip versus no evidence for black at all.  
Such reasoning implied a correct majority prediction because there was more evidence for the 
red, and at the same time a preference for the known bet, because there were assuredly 5 red 
chips in the known option versus assurance of only 1 red chip in the uncertain option.
4
 
   
 
 
3.  Experiment 3: Putting a Price Tag on Benefits from Learning 
 
Experiment 2 replicated the strong violations of learning that we found in Experiment 1.  It 
suggested in addition that even those who do not commit such strong violations may still miss 
the clear learning potential offered by uncertain probabilities. To study how well people are 
calibrated when learning under uncertainty, we designed an experiment in which the subjects 
would not choose between known and uncertain bets.  Rather, they would only make bets on 
uncertain options, some that offer learning and some that do not.  
 
 
                                                 
4 The single draw of a red chip conveys considerable information about other possible combinations of bag contents.  
For example, the odds of 7 red chip and 3 black versus 3 red and 7 black, which were originally even, have now 
shifted to 7 to 3. 13 
 
3.1 Design 
Forty-three subjects participated in an experiment in which they had to predict the color of a 
marble  drawn from an urn with 4 marbles, either red or black in an  uncertain  proportion.
5
To measure the strength of the learning opportunities perceived by the subjects, we 
elicited a prize-equivalent for sampling as follows. Subjects could either bet on a color drawn 
from the uncertain 4-chip bag, without any sample, for a winning prize of €20 for a correct 
prediction, or bet on a color drawn from this bag, after sampling one chip with replacement, for a 
winning prize of €x.  There existed some x<20 such that the subject was indifferent about either 
directly betting for a prize of €20 or betting after learning something about the distribution of 
colors for the lower prize of €x. We called this indifference value the lowest-acceptable prize 
(LAP) of the sampling opportunity.   
 
Without any sample, the probability of winning the prize in this bet equals 50%. With a sample 
of one marble with replacement, predicting the color sampled increases the chance of winning to 
61.73% and the expected value of the gamble by 23.47%. The percentage benefit from learning 
is larger in this experiment than in the REPEAT4 condition with 4 chips in experiment 1. In the 
repeated game, the subjects would still have to make the first bet without any information; 
therefore, the effect on the total expected earnings is smaller.   
We elicited the LAP using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1963, BDM) mechanism. In a 
bag we placed 39 slips of paper with prize offers between €.50 and €19.50 in equal steps of €.50. 
Subjects wrote down their LAP. If the randomly selected offered prize “y” was equal or larger 
than the specified LAP, the subject would make a bet after sampling once for a prize of €y. If the 
offered prize “y” was smaller than the LAP, the subject would directly predict the color of a 
chip, without sampling, for a prize of €20. After writing down their LAP, subjects also had to 
specify the color they wanted to predict in case they played without a sample for a prize of €20, 
and in case  they played with sampling for a price of €y. In the latter case, they had to specify 
two predictions, conditional on the color sampled. That is, we elicited full betting strategies for 
all contingencies.  
                                                 
5 Experiments 3 was conducted with marbles rather than chips. The marbles were drawn from a box containing 25 
marbles of each color, instead of 50 of each, as in the previous experiments. Calculations account for the size of the 
box.  
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Under expected payoff maximization, the optimal LAP was €16.20  because winning 
€16.20 with a 61.73% chance offers an expected value equal to winning €20 with a chance of 
50%, in the case of no sampling opportunity.
6
 
 The optimal strategy, obviously, involves betting 
on the color sampled.   
3.2 Results 
Based on the optimal LAP of €16.20, we defined people as well-calibrated learners if they 
specified a LAP between 14 and 18 inclusive.  That is a range of two full euros  below and above 
the optimal value, and it includes the prominent amount of €15.
7
 
    Thus, we applied a 
conservative criterion for learning neglect here. Table 4 shows the results.   
Table 4.  Valuation of Learning Opportunity  
    Well 
calibrated 
14≤LAP≤18 
Too hesitant to 
take sample 
(LAP>18) 
Too eager to 
take sample 
(LAP<14) 
All 
All 
Distribution by LAP   20 (47%)  8 (19%)  15 (35%)  43  
Avg. LAP   €15.73  €19.38  €9.07  €14.08 
Correct 
strategy  
Distribution by LAP   16 (57%)  5 (18%)  7 (25%)  28  
Avg. LAP   €15.91  €19.20  €9.71  €14.95 
Insensitive 
stickers 
Distribution by LAP   2 (25%)  2 (25%)  4 (50%)  8  
Avg. LAP   €15.00  €20.00  €9.50  €13.50 
Fallacious 
switchers 
Distribution by LAP   2 (29%)  1 (14%)  4 (57%)  7  
Avg. LAP   €15.00  €19.00  €7.5  €11.29 
Note: Percentages refer to the distribution within the row  
 
The first row shows the distribution of LAPs. Roughly half of the subjects were well-calibrated 
(LAP between 14 and 18); about one fifth were too hesitant to sample (LAP too high); and 35% 
were too eager (LAP too low). Indeed, the average LAP in the too-eager group was below the 
expected value of the gamble assuming the sample led to a guess that was always correct. Note 
                                                 
6 Risk aversion should lower a rational Bayesian subject’s LAP below 16.2.  A 50% chance to win 20 euros is a 
mean-preserving spread of a 61.73% chance to win 16.20 euros, hence is more risky.        
7 Most people specified full euro amounts. 15 
 
that the LAP implies a comparison between an uncertain option with no sample and an uncertain 
option with a sample of one draw. In contrast, the previous experiments compared an uncertain 
option with a sample to known risk with 5 chances out of 10. Subjects who held some maximin 
view might feel that they learned very little from one sample, but would find that far superior to 
no identifiable knowledge (uncertain urn with no sample).  Thus, they strongly preferred the one-
draw alternative and were too eager to reduce the uncertainty.  In interpreting these results with 
the BDM mechanism, we issue a cautionary note. BDM is difficult for participants to 
understand, and the “overpayment” for learning may have come because individuals did not 
grasp how they should respond.
8
 
 
The remaining rows of Table 4 distinguish subjects according to their betting strategies.  
Individuals who employed the correct learning strategy had a mean LAP about €15.  They were 
well calibrated 57% of the time. 
There were two groups who followed strategies contrary to the inference from the first 
draw: they bet against the color drawn. Thus, 8 of the 43 subjects (19%) of the sample got the 
first draw wrong, but stuck with their color (insensitive stickers). 7 subjects (16%) got the first 
draw correct, but then switched colors (fallacious switchers). Interestingly, both of these groups 
had lower average LAPs, respectively €13.50 and €11.29 than did those following correct 
strategy. Thus, they picked LAPs as if they were learning a lot, but then picked the wrong color. 
Both of these groups fell prey to the gambler’s fallacy: assuming that a color had not come up 
the first time was more likely to come up on the second trial. Such choices are well documented 
for choices with known probabilities, as say with red and black on a roulette wheel. Here they 
are more disturbing, because they are going contrary to learning. Roughly two thirds (28 of 43) 
of subjects bet correctly.  And 37% of subjects were both well-calibrated and followed optimal 
betting.   
                                                 
8 On average, our participants were willing to accept 14.08 for the game with learning, as opposed to 16.20, the 
actuarially fair value. They overpaid. -- We thank the referee for the observation about the BDM procedure. 
 
 16 
 
 
4.  Experiment 4: The Limits of Learning Neglect  
 
The previous experiments demonstrate various failures to anticipate learning under uncertainty 
when that uncertainty cannot be completely resolved. To examine the limiting conditions of this 
phenomenon, we considered two variations that we predicted would reduce the incidence of 
neglected learning benefits. First, we hypothesized that learning opportunities that eliminated all 
uncertainty would be taken by the subjects. Second, we predicted that experience in a learning 
task that revealed the general principle of learning under uncertainty would transfer to decisions 
in a task where learning was less obvious to people, the types of situations considered above.  
 
4.1 Design   
Thirty-two subjects participated in an experiment that had  two parts. Each part involved 
monetary incentives and was presented as a separate experiment to the subjects. At the end of the 
experiment one part was randomly selected by a coin flip for real payment.  The second part of 
the experiment was identical to the REPEAT4  repeated-urn  choice experiment presented in 
Section 1.  The first part of the experiment involved the following choice situation, modelled on 
the choice task in Charness and Levin (2005).  Subjects were presented with one white bag and 
two indistinguishable blue bags. The white bag contained exactly one red and one black marble. 
One of the blue bags contained exactly two red marbles; the other blue bag contained exactly two 
black marbles. The subjects knew the possible contents of the two blue bags, but did not know 
which one contained only red and which contained only black marbles.  Before learning about 
the decision problem, subjects chose one of the blue bags for the experiment, along with the 
white bag. The other blue bag was removed.  
  The decision problem was similar to the learning setting in Section 1.  The subjects had 
to choose either the white bag with the known and equal distribution of red and black, or an 
uncertain blue bag containing only either two red marbles or two black marbles. The bag would 
be used to make a repeated bet on the color of a marble drawn, with replacement.  Specifically, 
each subject first chose a bag, predicted a color, and then drew a marble; and the subject won €5 
if the prediction was correct, and nothing otherwise.  The marble was replaced in the bag, and the 
subject then again chose a bag, predicted a color, and drew a marble, winning another €5 if the 17 
 
prediction was correct.  In this repeated betting situation, the chance of winning the prize equaled 
50% for the known-risk white bag in both the first and the second drawings.  For a blue bag, the 
first drawing also offered a 50% chance of winning; the bag had been randomly selected with an 
equal chance of containing either two red or two black marbles, thus the winning probability was 
either 100% or 0%.  After betting on a color drawn from the blue bag in the first drawing, 
however, the subject learned the marble’s color with certainty.  That is, after the uncertainty of 
the first draw, the blue bag offered a certain gain of €5 in the second draw.  
After the first part of the experiment was finished, the bags were set aside; then Part II, 
the repeated urn choice REPEAT4, was conducted exactly as described in Section 1. The goal 
was to see if the definitive learning situation with the blue bags would help subjects recognize 
the potential for valuable but imperfect learning with the uncertain bag. 
 
4.2 Results 
Table  5  shows the results. In the Part 1 repeated-betting task with complete resolution of 
uncertainty for the uncertain blue bag in the second drawing, 75% of the subjects chose the 
uncertain  option (p=0.007, binomial test, two-sided). That is  far superior  to the previous 
experiments; the majority correctly understood the learning opportunity available for blue. Given 
the simplicity of the task, it is somewhat surprising that at least 25% of subjects did not see the 
benefit of the  uncertain probability.
9
While 75% of subjects acted as if they identified the learning opportunity in Part 1, the 
experience with Part 2 is disappointing. Only 31% of subjects chose the uncertain option in the 
repeated 4-chip urn choice task REPEAT4 (p=0.050, binomial test, two-sided), despite their 
exposure to Part 1.  Indeed, the percentage of people choosing the uncertain option differed little 
    However, we have observed serious learning failures 
before. The presence of this group of failed learners is consistent with the incidence of such 
learning deficits in our previous experiments, and also with the numbers observed in Charness 
and Levin’s (2005) baseline condition, the basis for the design of the part 1 decision. The results 
show that the potential for complete resolution of uncertainty can reduce but hardly eliminate 
learning neglect.   For subjects who intuited the basic advantage but underestimated the 
magnitude of learning, and for those who applied maximin learning, this task’s structure 
immediately revealed that uncertain probabilities offer learning opportunities.      
                                                 
9 25% is a lower bound, since some who chose the blue bag may have done so at random. 18 
 
from that in Experiment 1.  Clearly, the Part 1 experience failed to allow or alert subjects to 
understand the basic concept that securing information on an uncertain probability provides 
information.  Most subjects who chose the known-risk option in Part 1 also chose the known risk 
in Part 2, as would be expected.  However, 63% of those who chose the uncertain option in Part 
1 switched to the known option in Part 2. Thus, a majority of the subjects who appeared to get 
the right intuition in part 1, did not successfully transfer their insights regarding learning 
opportunities to the Part 2 task. 
 Table 5. The Limits of  Learning Neglect 
Part 1: 
Known  
(white: 1 red and 1 
black) 
Unknown  
(blue: either two red or  
two black) 
All 
  8 (25%)    24 (75%)    32   
Part 2:   Known  Unknown   Known  Unknown  Known  Unknown 
  7 (88%)
*  1 (12%)
*  15 (63%)
*  9 (27%)
*  22 (69%)
*  10 (31%)
* 
Compatible 
with learning 
(within part 2)
a 
1 (14%)
**  1 (100%)
**  4   (26%)
**  9 (100%)
**  5   (23%)
**  10 (100%)
** 
Notes: Part 1: Repeated bet with possible resolution of uncertainty.  Part 2: Repeated 4-chip urn 
choice task REPEAT4.  a: “As-if learning” for known-risk option: indicates a choice pattern that 
would have been compatible with learning had the subject played the unknown-risk option.  * 
Probabilities conditional on Part 1 choice.   ** Probabilities conditional on Part 1 and Part 2 
choices. 
 
Although the Part 1 experience did not prove sufficient to make most subjects recognize 
the benefits of uncertainty, it had some effects on behavior in the Part 2 decision problem 
REPEAT4. First, of those subjects who chose the unknown bag in Part 2, all made choices 
according to optimal learning, switching to/staying with the color drawn in the first trial (see 
bottom row of Table 5). In experiment 1 with no previous exposure to a statistical learning task, 
only 60% of subjects chose correctly in this fashion (Table 2). On the other hand, the Part 1 
exposure seems to increase the incidence of gambler’s fallacy for those who choose risky in Part 
2. These risky-choosers learned nothing in Part 2 between the two trials. However, the “as-if 
learning” entry in the bottom row of Table 5 describes their switching behavior between trials 
and thus serves as a benchmark for the behavior of the subjects who chose the unknown bag in 
part 2. Table 5 shows that only 23% of the risky choosers (p=0.017, binomial test, two-sided) 
switch as would be optimal had they chosen the uncertain bag. Because the index is below 50%, 19 
 
it shows that subjects switch after success and stay after failures, as is predicted by the gambler’s 
fallacy. Thus, while for some people the Part 1 task helps them to identify the optimal learning 
strategy, and to benefit from the uncertainty about probability, for a larger group of people it 
seems that  Part 1 potentially added to their confusion about optimal learning, leading to 
widespread gambler’s fallacy behavior for the risky bag.  
 
5. Discussion  
 
In the real world, uncertain  probabilities  of success are often  accompanied by a learning 
opportunity  because they will have future choices whose outcomes will be correlated.  If an 
innovative fast food restaurant proves successful in one neighborhood, it is much more likely to 
be successful in a second similar neighborhood. An employee who shows himself capable in one 
context is much more likely to be capable in another similar context. Real world decision makers 
do not seem to grasp the conceptual underpinnings of such learning opportunities. They often do 
not seem to anticipate the benefits of learning, and therefore do not choose alternatives with 
uncertain probabilities. They  are likely to  choose option A,  which  has a  60%  chance of 
succeeding over option B, which has a one half chance of being at 90% but one half of being at 
20%. This makes sense when a choice is made once, since the probability of success is 60% 
rather than 55%. But the decision maker should “pay for learning” and take the uncertain 
alternative  given these values when there  are two or more  choices  to be made.  Failing to 
experiment in this way, they will not observe successful outcomes from uncertain alternatives. 
Thus, they will have no chance to benefit from learning.  
We believe that most decision makers would  properly interpret the observation of 4 
successes and 1 failure as evidence of a high success probability if dealing with an uncertain 10 
chip urn. However, our results strongly suggest that most people will not obtain  helpful samples 
because, due to neglect or misconception of the mechanics of learning, they will shun 
uncertainty, settling on known alternatives that offer few or no learning opportunities. Examples 
where learning is not possible without an initial commitment to uncertain alternatives include 
scalable investments, new varieties of seed, or new medical treatments.  
From an evolutionary perspective, if the benefits from learning are large, why would 
learning avoidance persist?  This is a profound question.  Fortunately, some research points to a 20 
 
potential direction for the search for an answer.  Psychological findings suggest that negative 
experiences are crucial to learning, while good experiences have virtually no pedagogic power 
(Baumeister et al. 2001).  This appears related to the finding that in individual decision 
situations, losses often weigh 2 to 3 times as much as gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, 
Abdellaoui et al. 2007, Table 1, p.1662).  In the current setting, uncertain options would need to 
be sampled repeatedly in order to obtain a sufficient sample with few negative outcomes to 
determine whether to switch from the status quo.  People require too much positive evidence 
before shifting to uncertain options.
10
Other considerations, such as regret and blame avoidance, may  also  contribute to 
shunning uncertain alternatives. One does not know what returns would have come from an 
uncertain alternative. This reduces regret from not having chosen it.  Blame from others also 
plays an important role.  In principal-agent relationships, bad outcomes often lead to criticism, 
and possibly legal consequences because of responsibility and accountability. Therefore, agents, 
such as financial advisors or medical practitioners may experience a greater weighting of bad 
relative to good payoffs than do their principals (Eriksen and Kvaloy 2010a,b). Most people, for 
that reason, have had many fewer positive learning experiences with unknown alternatives than 
rational decision theory would prescribe. 
     
Our results may complement our  understanding of herding behavior and behavioral 
contagion in financial markets (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2009).  In a recent experimental study, 
Goeree and Yariv (2006) brought subjects into a situation with uncertain probabilities similar to 
the ones studied in our paper, and then let them choose between an informative private signal, 
and an uninformative social signal.  Specifically, subjects had to predict the contents of a jar that 
was filled with balls that were either predominantly red (7 red and 3 blue) or predominantly blue 
(7 blue and 3 red).  The prior probability of either distribution was 50%. Subjects could choose 
either of two pieces of information: (1) they could sample once with replacement from the jar 
before making their guess (informative statistical signal); or (2) they could choose to be told the 
predictions of 3 people who before them had randomly guessed the distribution without any 
statistical signal (uninformative social signal.). Across different conditions Goeree and Yariv 
                                                 
10 We recognize this is not a complete explanation of the outcome from evolution. The question then becomes why 
we need negative outcomes to learn. 21 
 
find that between 34% and 51% of their subjects choose the uninformative social signal.  They 
conclude that an intrinsic taste for conformity can explain their result.  
If people correctly understood the benefits of learning, Goeree and Yariv’s result would 
imply a strong preference for conformity.  A study by Corazinni and Greiner (2007) using a 
simple risky choice paradigm instead of learning, questions whether such strong preferences for 
conformity exists. Our results suggest that even a weak preference for conformity may be 
enough in the Goeree and Yariv learning paradigm, thus reconciling their results with those of 
Corazinni and Greiner. We showed that most people have little concept of learning in situations 
where information is gained but uncertainty is not definitively resolved. These learning violators 
will not perceive the statistical sample as a valuable option, implying that mild curiosity or 
conformity would be enough to induce them to copy other people’s uninformed choice. 
An interesting extension of the current paradigm concerns situations where uncertain 
alternatives are encountered repeatedly, and a success is needed on each trial to guarantee an 
overall success.  Thus a proposal in an organization needs a signoff from four independent 
divisions before it can go forward, with an equal probability of success in each division. The 
traditional format proposal has a 70% chance of approval from each division, implying an 
overall success rate of slightly less than 25%. The new format being contemplated has an 
uncertain chance of success within each division. It could be 90% or it could be 40%. Each is 
one half likely. Its overall success probability is ½(0.9
4 + 0.4
4) = 33.6%.  Though the percentage 
for success at each division is lower, namely (90+40)/2 = 65%, the overall probability of success 
has increased. This setting is quite different from the above learning paradigm. It is the positive 
correlation in the probability of success at each trial that offers the advantage.  
Given the results of the current paper, we predicted that people would have difficulties 
understanding the benefits of uncertainty in this quite different repeated setting as well. We 
conducted an experiment using the bags filled according to  experiment 1’s REPEAT10 
conditions. The subjects had to pick the known or unknown bag, and then pick one color that 
would apply for two draws with replacement. If both draws were of their color they won 10 
euros, and otherwise nothing. The chances of winning were 25% with the known urn, but 27.2% 
with the unknown urn. Only 12 out 32 subjects choose the superior uncertain urn. The potential 
beneficial effects of uncertain probabilities when a series of successes is needed were missed. 
Uncertainty was shunned quite apart from the learning paradigm studied in this paper.  22 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Whether in financial, medical or other decisions, learning opportunities in which outcomes and 
probabilities are uncertain offer large gains over known risks. Many paths produce erroneous 
thinking about learning; the most prominent of them simply does not see the possibility.  Indeed, 
an extreme learning experience – full resolution of a probability – in a similar setting proved to 
be an insufficient spur. The broad finding from diverse experiments is that individuals shun 
uncertainty and fail to recognize the benefits of learning that it offers.   23 
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